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Lower Hospital Prices
ABSTRACT The long-term trend of consolidation among US health plans
has raised providers’ concerns that the concentration of health plan
markets can depress their prices. Although our study confirmed that, it
also revealed a more complex picture. First, we found that 64 percent of
hospitals operate in markets where health plans are not very
concentrated, and only 7 percent are in markets that are dominated by a
few health plans. Second, we found that in most markets, hospital
market concentration exceeds health plan concentration. Third, our
study confirmed earlier studies showing that greater hospital market
concentration leads to higher hospital prices. Fourth, we found that
hospital prices in the most concentrated health plan markets are
approximately 12 percent lower than in more competitive health plan
markets. Overall, our results show that more concentrated health plan
markets can counteract the price-increasing effects of concentrated
hospital markets, and that—contrary to conventional wisdom—increased
health plan concentration benefits consumers through lower hospital
prices as long as health plan markets remain competitive. Our findings
also suggest that consumers would benefit from policies that maintained
competition in hospital markets or that would restore competition to
hospital markets that are uncompetitive.
A
s the long-term trend of consolida-
tion amongUShealth plans contin-
ues, providers have voiced growing
concern that health plans will ac-
quire such market power that they
will be able to depress the prices paid to provid-
ers. The American Hospital Association has ar-
gued that health plan consolidation leads to
“reimbursement to hospitals andphysicians that
is below competitive levels,” thereby threatening
both the quality of care and patients’ access to it.1
The AmericanMedical Association has proposed
legislation that would allow physicians to bar-
gain collectivelywithhealthplanswithout fear of
antitrust prosecution, so as to “level the playing
field” in price negotiations.2,3
Despite the importanceof these issues, and the
growing interest in them, there is limited empir-
ical evidence regarding the relationship between
concentrated health plan markets—that is,
markets where most people with private health
insurance purchase it from one to just several
insurers—and the prices that plans pay to
providers. There have also been few studies of
the relationships among the level of concentra-
tion in the market of health plans; the level of
concentration in themarket of hospitals; and the
prices that hospital charge.4,5 This article adds to
the literature by studying how both health plan
market concentration and hospital market con-
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The Framework For The Study
The literature on hospital pricing and on bar-
gaining between hospitals and health plans
serves as the framework for our empirical analy-
ses. Health plans compete with each other on
price—the premiums they charge—along with
the quality and accessibility of the providers in-
cluded in their networks or benefit packages.
Because the cost of hospital care represents
abouthalf of thehealth carecosts that plansmust
pay, the prices that they pay hospitals have a
large impact on the premiums they must charge.
Mark Pauly suggests that larger plans should be
able to secure lower prices from hospitals than
smaller plans can.6 Accordingly, because the
average size of the plans in more concentrated
markets—those with fewer health plans—is
larger, prices should be lower.
However, health plans’ bargaining power also
depends on plans’ ability to send their members
to competing, lower-price hospitals for care,
rather than having to use a more expensive hos-
pital.7,8 The ability of health plans to substitute
one provider for another to create competition
and generate lower prices depends on the con-
centration of the hospital market in which the
plans arebuying services.Research shows that in
concentrated markets, health plans pay higher
prices to hospitals.9
According to this framework, increasing the
market concentration of health plans has the
opposite effect on hospitals’ prices from increas-
ing the market concentration of hospitals. Thus,
the prices that hospitals receive will depend on
the relative concentration in the market of both
plans and hospitals. Our analyses included plan
and hospital market concentration measures to
explore how these factors affect hospital prices.
Study Data And Methods
DataOur sample included all general, acute care
hospitals not owned by the federal government
that were located in Metropolitan Statistical
Areas in2001 and2004.Hospital data came from
Medicare hospital cost reports, the American
Hospital Association Annual Surveys, and a
database of multihospital systems provided by
Kristin Madison and Sujoy Chakravarty.10–12
The federal government’s Area Resource File
and the Medicare Impact files provided the area
wage index, per capita income, unemployment
rate, and population data.We obtainedmanaged
care data for health maintenance organizations
and preferred provider organizations in 2001
and 2004 from InterStudy, a health care data
company; these data covermore than 90 percent
of the United States.
The final analytical sample contained 4,017
hospital-year observations and included more
than 90 percent of all hospitals located in
Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
Methods First, we summarized the distribu-
tion of hospitals and Metropolitan Statistical
Areas across different levels of market concen-
tration for both health plans and hospitals. We
constructed multivariate models to explore the
effects of health plan and hospital market con-
centration on hospital prices. In one model, we
estimated the effects of market concentration of
both plans andhospitals on hospital prices, after
adjusting for other factors that affect hospital
prices. For example, because previous research
has shown that prices can be lower in areas
wheremore of the population is enrolled inman-
aged care plans,13 we included the level of man-
aged care penetration in the market as an addi-
tional factor.
In a secondmodel, we tested for the possibility
that health plan concentration effects on hospi-
tals were much stronger in the most concen-
trated markets, compared to less concentrated
ones, by dividing health plan markets into four
categories, based on health plan concentration.
We employed standard statistical methods to
adjust for the fact that we used a pooled cross-
sectional database for our analysis.14 Finally, we
conducted a series of statistical tests to validate
our key assumptions and found that our results
were unchanged and statistically robust.15
Hospital Prices Because actual hospital
prices paid by private health plans, such as per
diemprices, arenot available on anational basis,
we constructed our statistical models to produce
a valid proxy for hospital prices. Following other
researchers,13,16,17 we regressed total hospital net
revenue on a set of independent variables that
included hospital volume (total adjusted patient
days)18 andhospital case-mix. Case-mixwasmea-
sured by theMedicare case-mix index, ameasure
of patients’ level of illness.
Because net revenue equals price times quan-
tity, by including a quantity measure we con-
trolled for and effectively held constant the
changes in net revenue related to quantity, while
the case-mix measure controlled for changes re-
lated to patient severity over time.19 The total net
revenue included Medicare and Medicaid reve-
nue as well as revenue fromprivate payers, so we
also controlled for the changes in revenue due to
the mix and prices of different payers.
Health Plan Concentration We constructed
a standard concentration index variablewith val-
ues that ranged from close to 0 to 10,000. A
monopolymarket—that is, amarketwith a single
health plan—had a value of 10,000, while a value
close to 0 represented a highly competitive, less
concentrated market.
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Using Metropolitan Statistical Areas as the
geographic market for health plans, we summed
the squared value of each health plan’s Metro-
politan Statistical Area market share. If a health
plan offered both health maintenance organiza-
tion and preferred provider organization prod-
ucts in a given metropolitan area, we first added
the enrollment in each together and then calcu-
lated themarket share of the combined products
before computing the concentration index.
Other studies have calculated these values sep-
arately for both health maintenance organiza-
tion and preferred provider organization prod-
ucts under the assumption that they serve
separate product markets. However, it is more
likely that consumers see these two typesofplans
as similar enough that they are willing to switch
between the two. Thus, both types of products
should be included in the same market.20–22
To measure health plan concentration, we
used a standard concentration index, again with
values ranging from close to 0 to 10,000. We
divided Metropolitan Statistical Areas into four
categories, based on their health plan concen-
tration index: less than 1,000, 1,000–1,800,
1,801–3,200, and greater than 3,200. These
thresholds were chosen to facilitate comparison
with other studies of health planmarket concen-
tration and are consistent with the Department
of Justice 1997 Merger Guidelines.23
Managed Care Penetration and Hospital
Market Concentration Following previous
studies,24,25 we calculatedmanaged care penetra-
tion as the total population of a metropolitan
area that was enrolled in either a health main-
tenance organization or a preferred provider
organization in a given year, divided by the total
population of that area in that year.
We calculated a hospital-specific concentra-
tion index for each hospital’smarket, using stan-
dard methods.26
Control Variables Following other stud-
ies,27,28 we included supply anddemand variables
that might affect hospital prices, including a
wage index (as a proxy for input prices); Medi-
care’s and Medicaid’s shares of total inpatient
discharges (to control for payer mix); hospital
ownership (not-for-profit, for-profit, or govern-
ment); hospital teaching status; hospital system
membership status; Medicare case-mix index
(log transformed); total adjusted patient days
(log transformed); per capita income in the hos-
pital’s geographic area (log transformed); and
thepercentage of for-profit andgovernmenthos-
pitals within a fifteen-mile radius.
We also included time variables to control for
general trends in hospital prices over time, and
geographic variables (including each hospital’s
census region) interacted with time variables to
capture regional differences in hospital prices
over time.
Limitations Although our market concentra-
tion data cover the period between 2001 and
2004, our results are likely to remain valid today.
Consolidation has continued within both hospi-
tal and health plan markets, but increases in
market concentration have slowed because anti-
trust regulations limit mergers and acquisitions
that greatly increase concentration in local mar-
kets. Our statistical results are generally descrip-
tive in nature, which limits our ability to make
strong causal inferences regarding the welfare
effects of the relative concentrationbetweenhos-
pital and health plan markets.
Study Results
Hospital and health plan market concentration
differs across the country (Exhibit 1). Thirty-two
metropolitan areas (10 percent) are in the most
competitive category for health plans and ac-
count for 13 percent of US hospital revenues
for 2004. The most concentrated category for
health plans contains thirty-five areas and 7 per-
cent of hospital revenues for 2004.
Hospital market concentration varies only
slightly across the categories, ranging from
3,204 to 3,661 (Exhibit 1). And only in the most
concentrated health plan markets does the
health plan concentration divided by the hospi-
tal concentration exceed 1.0. These results indi-
cate that hospitals face less competition in their
own markets than health plans face in theirs.
More than 90 percent of all hospitals (2,111 of
2,276) operate in markets where the hospital
market concentration exceeds the health plan
market concentration.
Higher health plan market concentration re-
duces hospital prices, while higher hospitalmar-
ket concentration increases them. For example,
a 1,000-point increase in the health plan concen-
tration index is, on average, associated with
2.5 percent lower hospital prices, while a
1,000-point increase in hospital concentration
values is associated with an 8.3 percent increase
in hospital prices. Model 2 shows that health
plan concentration reduces hospital prices at a
much greater rate in those areas where health
plan markets are the most concentrated but re-
duces them at a much smaller rate in less con-
centrated ones (Exhibit 2).
Discussion
Previous research has documented a trend of
consolidation amongUShealth plans.29 Provider
groups such as the American Hospital Associa-
tion argue that health plan markets are already
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highly concentrated, and that continued consoli-
dation will allow plans to gain additional market
power, which will give them too much bargain-
ing power over providers.1
Our findings add several new and important
insights to this discussion. Our descriptive
analyses show that 64 percent of hospitals oper-
ate in markets where health plans are not very
concentrated, and only 7 percent are in the most
concentrated health plan markets (Exhibit 1).
These results suggest that contrary to conven-
tionalwisdom,very fewhospitals operate inmar-
kets with only a few dominant health plans.
Our statistical results show that although
higher health plan concentration is associated
with lower hospital prices on average, this rela-
tionship is not constant. In fact, hospital prices
are significantly affected only when health plan
concentration index values are above 3,200
(Exhibit 2). These findings lend support to the
argument that highly concentrated health plan
markets can lead to lower provider prices.
At the same time, our results are consistent
with previous research9,30 showing that hospital
prices are higher in more concentrated hospital
markets. Higher hospital concentration is asso-
ciated in all of our models with higher hospital
prices. For example, a 1,000-percentage-point
increase in the hospital concentration index
raises prices by approximately 8.3 percent
(Exhibit 2).
Taken together, our results show that more
concentrated health plan markets can counter-
act the price-increasing effects of concentrated
hospital markets.
Policy Implications Our results have impli-
cations for health care policy. Under the Afford-
able Care Act of 2010, states are beginning to
regulate insurance premiums to control costs;
our results suggest that restoring competition
to hospital markets would have an even larger
effect. Regulators should continue to monitor
health plan consolidation to prevent excess con-
centration, but they should also adopt proactive
policies to increasehospitalmarket competition.
Many areas in theUnited States are dominated
by several large local or national hospital sys-
tems that negotiate collectively with health
plans. This reduces competition and raises hos-
pital prices. Because such large systemsmay pro-
vide increased efficiency and quality, we do not
recommend breaking them up. But regulators
could require hospitals in the systems to nego-
tiate independently with health plans. The
Federal Trade Commission recently applied this
approach to hospitals operating in Illinois.31 And
Medicare should be careful not to create concen-
trated organizations that reduce competition
when it establishes large, provider-based
accountable care organizations.
Increased transparency would also benefit
consumers. Providers should be required to
share utilization and cost data with payers such
as large employers. Currently, many of these
employers do not have access to data on how
much care their employees are using, and how
much they are paying for it.
Exhibit 1























<1,000 32 326 13 854 3,204 0.28 57
1,000–1,800 129 1,131 51 1,409 3,265 0.46 59
1,801–3,200 122 654 28 2,284 3,570 0.66 57
>3,200 35 165 7 3,977 3,661 1.11 59
Total 318 2,276 99 1,714 3,361 0.52 58
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on data from InterStudy and the American Hospital Association Annual Surveys. NOTES The concentrations, concentration index, and
penetration are explained in the text. Percentages of hospital revenue do not sum to 100 because of rounding.
Exhibit 2
Changes In Hospital Prices Associated With Hospital And Health Plan Market Concentration
Percent change in hospital prices
Concentration index Model 1 Model 2
Hospital (for 1,000-point increase) 8.3** 8.3**
Health plan (for 1,000-point increase) –2.5** —
Health plan 1,000–1,800 — –1.0
Health plan 1,801–3,200 — –3.0
Health plan > 3; 200 — –12.17**
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on regression analysis. NOTES Estimates control for other
variables. The results for other control variables are given in the online Appendix (to access the
Appendix, click on the Appendix link in the box to the right of the article online). The two models
are described in the text. **p < 0:05
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Future Research Questions We found that
hospital markets, on average, were much more
concentrated than health plan markets. These
findings depend in part on the definition and
measurement of health plan products and mar-
kets. We combined health maintenance organi-
zations and preferred provider organizations
into a single product market because we as-
sumed that consumers are willing to substitute
one for the other and that an insurer offering
both products negotiates with providers as one
entity. However, others have treated these or-
ganizations as separate product markets or used
other approaches.4,29 Assuming that there are
separate product markets leads to smaller mar-
kets and higher health plan concentration index
values. Research is needed to validate these as-
sumptions.
Another question is whether fee-for-service
care paid for by Medicare and Medicaid should
be included in thedenominatorwhencalculating
health plan market shares and concentration
values. New studies should focus on these im-
portant conceptual andmeasurement issues and
examine interactions with other markets—such
as physician markets—which may have different
underlying structures. We also need further re-
search to extend our understanding of how these
and other market structure variables work to-
gether to affect the prices that consumers ulti-
mately pay each year to purchase health insur-
ance and medical care. ▪
External funding for this research was
provided by the Robert Wood Johnson
Changes in Health Care Financing and
Organization (HCFO) initiative.
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